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Abstract
First price auctions are widely used in government contracts and industrial auc-
tions. In this paper, we consider the Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (BNE) in first
price auctions with discrete value distributions. We study the characterization of
the BNE in the first price auction and provide an algorithm to compute the BNE at
the same time. Moreover, we prove the existence and the uniqueness of the BNE.
Some of the previous results in the case of continuous value distributions do not
apply to the case of discrete value distributions. In the meanwhile, the unique-
ness result in discrete case cannot be implied by the uniqueness property in the
continuous case.
Unlike in the continuous case, we do not need to solve ordinary differential
equations and thus do not suffer from the solution errors therein. Compared to
the method of using continuous distributions to approximate discrete ones, our
experiments show that our algorithm is both faster and more accurate.
The results in this paper are derived in the asymmetric independent private val-
ues model, which assumes that the buyers’ value distributions are common knowl-
edge.
∗The codes for solving the BNE in our setting can be found at https://github.com/emersonswr/
discrete_fpa_bne
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1 Introduction
Recently, the display advertising industry has switched from second-price to first-price
auctions,1 and one important reason is that some advertisers no longer trust the exchange
to honestly follow the second-price auction rules [25]. From a bidder’s point of view, he
does not trust the auctioneer since the auctioneer could also benefit from manipulating
the auction rules after observing the sealed bids [1]. Akbarpour and Li [1] show that
the first-price auction is the unique credible and static optimal auction, which may be
one potential backing theory for the trend of adopting the first-price auction in the ad
exchange industry. Akbarpour and Li [1] also prove that no mechanism is static, credible,
and strategy-proof (incentive compatible) at the same time. In particular, being credible
means that it is incentive compatible for the auctioneer to follow the rules and being static
roughly means that the auction is sealed-bid. Therefore, the first-price auction naturally
becomes the only choice for the ad exchange industry, in which credibility becomes a
major concern and sealed-bid is also critical to keep the auction process time-efficient for
production needs.
In contrast to the crucial needs from practice, the understanding of the first-price
auction from auction theory remains shallow compared with that of other direct auc-
tions. The essential obstacle is the complex equilibrium structure in first-price auctions.
Following the first step by Vickrey [26] for the symmetric setting, it has been a tough and
long journey towards the existence, the uniqueness and the computation of the Bayesian
Nash equilibrium of first-price auctions in general settings.Plum [22] covers the power
distribution F1(x) = xµ and F2(x) = (xβ )
µ with the same support. Kaplan and Zamir [12]
solve the problem for uniform distributions with different support.
In this paper, with the application in ad auctions as one of the important motivations,
we focus on the computation of BNEs in first-price auctions where the bidders’ values
are independently drawn from discrete prior distributions. We study the discrete value
setting for several reasons. First, it is a basic setting with a different structure from the
continuous case. The results in the discrete setting can provide us with more structural
insights that can not be obtained from the continuous case. Second, such a setting is
more realistic in practice. Consider the situation where prior information is expensive or
impossible to acquire. In such situations, we might only have historical samples of the
buyer’s values, and it is reasonable to aggregate these discrete values to form a discrete
empirical distribution.
Our algorithm does not involve ordinary differential equations, which makes our al-
gorithm robust and much faster.
1.1 Our Contributions
• We give an efficient algorithm to find the BNE of the first price auction. For
any possible bid, by scrutinizing the bidders who might report it, we give a clear
characterization of the BNE in the discrete setting. Previous methods make use of
Nash’s Theorem to prove the existence of the equilibrium in the continuous case,
while we provide a constructively proof in the discrete case.
1The winners now pay the bid price in the Exchange Bidding auctions by Google Ad Manager (Google’s
display ad-serving system for publishers). In Exchange Bidding auctions, the exchanges bid to compete
for ad requests from publishers https://support.google.com/admanager/answer/7128958.
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• We show that the equilibrium is unique in the discrete case (Theorem 9). The
uniqueness result by Lebrun [16] relies on a technical assumption about buyers’
value distributions. In contrast, we do not need any assumption. Furthermore, in
the continuous case, we need to be very careful when a buyer’s value is near the
smallest value. In the discrete case, each buyer’s strategy around the smallest value
has relatively nice properties.
1.2 Related Works
Besides the closed-form solution of the equilibrium, there is also a line of papers that
focus on other aspects of the problem [24, 23, 21]. The existence of a Bayesian Nash
equilibrium is given by Lebrun [13], Maskin and Riley [19], Athey [2]. They first show
the existence for discrete distributions by applying Nash’s Theorem. Then they show
the existence in the continuous case by constructing a series of discrete distributions that
approaches the actual continuous case. In this paper, we prove the existence result by
construction.
After proving the existence of the BNE, researchers began to consider the its unique-
ness. For symmetric distributions, Chawla and Hartline [4] prove the uniqueness by
ruling out asymmetric equilibria. For asymmetric distributions, Maskin and Riley [20]
show that the equilibrium is unique for symmetric distributions with the assumption that
there is positive mass at the lower possible value. Lebrun [14, 16] prove the uniqueness for
more general settings but still with the assumption that the cumulative value distribution
functions are strictly log-concave at certain points. Escamocher et al. [5] investigates the
existence and the computation of BNEs in the discrete case, under the assumption that
bidders can only place discrete bids. They consider both the randomized tie-breaking
and the Vickery tie-breaking and give different results.
However, both the continuous and the discrete case without assumptions are still left
open. In this paper, we solve the discrete value distribution case.
In the numerical analysis literature, Marshall et al. [18] give the first numerical analysis
for two special distributions. Their backward-shooting method then become the standard
method for computing the equilibrium strategies of asymmetric first-price auctions [3,
6, 17]. The backward-shooting method first computes the smallest winning bid, then
repeatedly guess the largest winning bid and then solving ordinary differential equations
all the way down in the bid space to see if the smallest winning bid given by the solution
to the differential equations matches the actual one. One common issue of this method
is the computation error in solving ordinary differential equations. Bajari [3] uses a
polynomial to approximate the inverse bidding strategy. To compute a solution with high
precision, Gayle and Richard [9] use Taylor-series expansions. Our method belongs to the
backward-shooting category. We do not need to solve ordinary differential equations, but
the algorithm still needs to repeatedly guess the largest winning bid. Fibich and Gavish
[8] propose a forward-shooting method and numerically solve the case with power-law
distributions. However this forward-shooting method does not work in the discrete case.
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2 Preliminaries
2.1 Model
Suppose the seller has one item for sale and there are n potential buyers N = {1, ..., n}.
The item is sold through a sealed-bid first-price auction. Each buyer has a private value
for the item, which is drawn according to a publicly known value distribution. In our
setting, we consider the case where the each buyer’s value distribution is discrete. Also, we
assume that for buyer i, the value support is a finite set {v1i , v2i , ..., vdii } with cumulative
distribution function Gi, with Gi(v) = Prob{vi ≤ v}. Without loss of generality, we
assume 0 ≤ v1i < v2i < . . . < vdii .
Every buyer places a nonnegative bid bi simultaneously. Let Fi(bi) denote the cumu-
lative distribution function of buyer i’s bids. We assume that buyers have quasi-linear
utilities and no buyer overbids, i.e., no buyer will place a bid that is higher than his value.
The buyer with the highest bid wins the item and pays what he bids. Each buyer’s strat-
egy is a mapping from his private value to his bid. The strategies form a Bayesian Nash
Equilibrium (BNE) if no bidder has an incentive to change his strategy unilaterally in
the Bayesian setting.
In the continuous value setting, each buyer’s strategy maps a value to a bid. For
example, suppose there are two i.i.d. buyers with value uniformly distributed between
[0, 1]. In the BNE, each buyer bids half of his private value.
But in the discrete setting, each buyer’s strategy is randomized, and maps a value
to a set of possible bids, with a certain probability distribution. Consider the following
example.
Example 1. There are two i.i.d. buyers. Each buyer has value 1 and 2 with probability
0.5. In the equilibrium, when a buyer’s value is 2, it is possible for him to place any bid
in [1, 1.5], and the bid density function is 1
(2−x)2 , ∀x ∈ [1, 1.5]. When a buyer’s value is 1,
the buyer bids 1 with probability 1.
Figure 1: The equilibrium strategy of two i.i.d. buyers with uniform {1, 2} value distri-
bution. Although the value distribution is discrete, the bids are continuous.
Our objective is to find the bidding strategies that constitute a Bayesian Nash equi-
librium. Before we start, we need to make an assumption of the tie-breaking rule to
guarantee the existence of an equilibrium. To see this, suppose there are multiple high-
est bids, and we allocate the item randomly among the corresponding buyers. In the
following example, there is no BNE.
Example 2 (Maskin and Riley [19]). There are two buyers. Buyer 1 has two possible
values {1, 2}, both with probability 0.5, and Buyer 2 has only one possible value 1, with
probability 1.
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Suppose there is a BNE. There are 2 possible cases in the equilibrium.
• Buyer 2 always bids 1. Buyer 1 has value 2, he wins with probability 1 if he bids
1 +  where  is a small positive number. Buyer 1’s utility is 2− 1− . Thus buyer
1 always prefers a smaller  as long as  > 0. However if he chooses  to be zero,
Buyer 1 wins with probability 0.5 and the utility drops to (2− 1)× 0.5 = 0.5. Thus
Buyer 1 with value 2 has no best response.
• Buyer 2 bids 1 with probability strictly less than 1. Consider the lowest possible
bid b that any buyer would place. Since no buyer overbids, we have b < 1. If both
buyers bid b with positive probability then they both have incentives to bid b + . It
cannot be a BNE. If one buyer bids b with zero probability then the other buyer will
not bid b because he will lose. It cannot be a BNE.
It turns out that there is no BNE in this example if we break ties randomly. We
consider an alternative tie-breaking rule introduced by Maskin and Riley [19]. When
there are multiple highest bids, we will allocate the item to the buyer with the highest
value.
Assumption 1 (Maskin and Riley [19]). Ties are broken by running a Vickrey auction
among the highest buyers.2
In the continuous value setting, this assumption is unnecessary, but in the discrete
value setting, we need this assumption to deal with best response issue. Without this
assumption, we will still get an approximate BNE using our algorithm. We will discuss
more about this assumption(see Example 3).
2.2 Basic structure of the BNE
To assist later arguments, we restate several properties of the Bayesian Nash equilibrium,
mainly summarized by Maskin and Riley [20].3 Giving all buyers’ strategies, if any buyer
can win with a certain probability by bidding b then we call b a winning bid. Without
loss of generality, we assume the set of winning bids is closed and there exists a smallest
winning bid b. As long as a buyer’s bid is higher than or equal to b, he can win with a
certain probability. If buyers’ strategies form a BNE, the smallest winning bid b will be
determined uniquely by the buyers’ value distributions:
Lemma 1 (Maskin and Riley [20]). Assume buyer i∗ has the largest smallest value, i.e.,
v1i∗ = maxj v
1
j . Then the smallest winning bid is
b = arg max
b
(v1i∗ − b)
∏
i 6=i∗
Gi(b).
We claim that smallest bid placed by buyer i∗ is exactly b:
• On the one hand, b must be larger than or equal to the smallest bid of buyer 1.
Otherwise, other buyers will have no incentive to place bid b, since giving b always
loses.
2This can be implemented by letting the highest buyers submit new bids.
3Although they assume twice continuously differentiable value distributions and the buyers have the
same upper limit of values, the lemmas still hold for the present setting.
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• On the other hand, b must be smaller than or equal to the smallest bid of buyer i∗,
otherwise he will have negative utilities.
According to Example 1, a buyer with a certain value vji may place multiple bids.
Let Si(vji ) be the set of possible bids for buyer i when he has value v
j
i . For ease of
presentation, we assume that Si(vji ) is a closed set, otherwise, we can take the closure of
the support as Si(vji ). Denote buyer i’s all possible bids by Si, i.e., Si =
⋃
j Si(v
j
i ).
Maskin and Riley [20] show that for any winning bid b, there are at least two buyers i
and j, such that b ∈ Si and b ∈ Sj. The intuition is that any buyer who places a winning
bid b needs a competitor, otherwise, the buyer can place b−  to increase his utility.
Lemma 2 (Maskin and Riley [20]). In the BNE of the first-price auction, for buyer i
and any bi > b, if bi ∈ Si, then there must exist another buyer, who bids in (bi − , bi)
with positive probability for any .
Proof. Buyer i’s utility is positive since he can bid b +  which implies positive winning
probability and positive utility conditioned on winning. There is no buyer who bids bi
with positive probability, otherwise buyer i can increase his utility by bidding bi + . If
there is another buyer who bids in (bi − , bi) with zero probability, then buyer i has an
incentive to decrease his bid to bi −  which strictly increases his utility.
Maskin and Riley [20] show that, in first price auctions, a buyer would not give a
particular bid with positive probability when this bid is larger than or equal to b.
Lemma 3 (Maskin and Riley [20]). For any buyer i, there is no mass point above b in
buyer i’s bid distribution.
The following lemma shows that when a buyer’s value is larger than or equal to b, his
bidding strategy is monotone in his value.
Lemma 4 (Maskin and Riley [20]). For each buyer, his bidding strategy is monotone in
value, i.e., maxSi(vji ) ≤ minSi(vj+1i ) for vji ≥ b.
Here we provide an example of what the BNE looks like in the discrete case. The
computation of such a BNE will be clear after the analysis of our algorithm.
Example 3. Suppose there are 4 buyers with the following discrete value distributions:
G1(x) =

1 x = 20
11
√
7
24
√
3
x = 10√
77
12
√
2
x = 2
, G2(x) =

1 x = 14
4√
21
x = 13
2
√
22
7
√
7
x = 1
,
G3(x) =
{
1 x = 20
11
12
x = 9
, G4(x) =
{
1 x = 12
3
√
3
2
√
7
x = 1
.
In the BNE, the buyers bid according to the following bid distributions:
F1(x) =

11
20−x x ∈ (8, 9]
11
12
√
2(20−x)
(14−x)(12−x) x ∈ (6, 8]
77
48
√
10−x
(9−x)(13−x) x ∈ [2, 6]
, F2(x) =

√
8(14−x)
(20−x)(12−x) x ∈ (6, 8]
8
7
√
13−x
(10−x)(9−x) x ∈ [2, 6]
2
√
22
7
√
7
x = 1
,
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F3(x) =
{
11
20−x x ∈ [8, 9]
11
6
√
7(9−x)
3(10−x)(13−x) x ∈ [2, 6]
, F4(x) =

√
18(12−x)
(20−x)(14−x) x ∈ [6, 8]
3
√
3
2
√
7
x = 1
.
Figure 2: Each value’s corresponding bid interval is indicated by braces. A dot implies
a positive probability (point mass). Buyer 1 with value 2 and Buyer 3 with value 9 are
both likely to bid 2. According to Assumption 1, Buyer 3 wins in this case.
3 Overview of our algorithm
As mentioned in Section 1.2, our algorithm falls in the backward-shooting category. In
first-price auctions, if the largest winning bid b¯ is given, our theoretical analysis enables
us to compute the buyers’ bid distributions all the way down to the smallest winning bid
b. However, it turns out that we only know how to compute the smallest winning bid
b (Theorem 1), but have no idea about b¯. Therefore, the backward-shooting algorithms
just repeatedly guess b¯ and see if the computed b(b¯) matches the actual b, reducing the
computation of the BNE to a searching problem. An overview of the backward-shooting
algorithm is shown in Algorithm 1, where a binary search algorithm is used.
In Algorithm 1, UB and LB are the upper bound and the lower bound of the largest
winning bid. According to Lemma 1, the smallest winning bid b can be easily determined.
The exit condition measures how close our guess of b¯ is to the actual largest winning bid,
for example, we can check if UB−LB <  or we can compare whether b(b¯) is close enough
to b. And guaranteed by Theorem 6, 7 and Corollary 1, we know that b(b¯) is monotone
with respect to the current guess b¯, and how to adjust UB and LB accordingly.
In the continuous value distribution case, the computation of b(b¯) given b¯ is done
through solving ordinary differential equations. However, in the discrete case, we compute
b(b¯) with Algorithm 2. We define a core structure called the “bidding set” (Definition 1),
and starting from b¯, we update the bidding set as the bid goes down (i.e., compute
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ALGORITHM 1: Overview of the backward-shooting algorithm
Input : Buyers’ value distributions Gi.
Output: Buyers’ bid distributions Fi.
1 Compute the smallest winning bid b using Lemma 1 ;
2 UB ← max{∪i∈N supp(Gi)}, LB ← 0 ;
3 while some exit condition is not met do
4 b¯← 12(UB + LB);
5 Compute Fi all the way down from b¯ to the corresponding smallest winning bid b(b¯);
6 if b(b¯) > b then
7 UB ← b¯ ;
8 else
9 LB ← b¯ ;
10 end
11 end
12 return Fi;
ALGORITHM 2: Compute b(b¯) given guess b¯.
Input : the largest winning bid guess b¯.
Output: the smallest winning bid b(b¯).
1 Initialize b← b¯,Λ(b)← ∅ ;
2 Update Λ(b) by repeatedly adding buyers to Λ(b) according to Theorem 4;
3 while |Λ(b)| ≥ 2 and b > 0 do
4 Predict the next change position b′ according to Theorem 5 and 4;
5 Set b← b′;
6 Update the bidding set Λ(b′) by removing buyers according to Theorem 5;
7 Update the bidding set Λ(b′) by adding buyers according to Theorem 4;
8 end
9 return b(b¯) = b;
where each buyer enters or leaves the bidding set with all his values). Each buyer enters
the bidding set with his largest “unconsumed” value when certain conditions are met
(Theorem 4), and leaves the bidding set when the probability of the corresponding value
is used up (Theorem 5), hence the value is “consumed”. After all buyers consumed all their
values, the corresponding b(b¯) is found. In our setting, Algorithm 2 is used in Algorithm
1 as a sub-routine.
4 The bidding set
Our objective is to compute every buyer’s strategy in BNE. Since a buyer’s bidding
strategy is monotone, it suffices to compute the bid distribution because we can map a
buyer’s value to a bid with the same quantile in his bid distribution. However, when the
bid support is not continuous, there might exist multiple bids with the same quantile.
In this section, we analyze the structure of the BNE. We introduce a useful tool called
the “bidding set”, and analyze how the bidding set changes in the bid space. With the
analysis of the structure, an algorithm of computing the BNE can be naturally derived.
Definition 1 (Bidding set and waiting list). The set of buyers whose bidding strategies
include bid x is called the bidding set, denoted by Λ(x), i.e., Λ(x) = {i | x ∈ Si}.
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The set of other buyers N − Λ(x) is called the waiting list at bid x.
When there is no ambiguity, we use Λ instead. The following theorem is about the
relationship between the bid distribution and Λ. For any buyer set Λ, let FΛ(x) denote
the product of the cumulative bid distribution of buyers in Λ, i.e., FΛ(x) =
∏
i∈Λ(x) Fi(x).
We abuse notation and use vi(x) to represent player i’s value when he bids x in the
equilibrium (vi(x) is well-defined according to Lemma 4).
Before discussing how the bidding set Λ changes in the bid space, let’s first consider
some properties of the bidding set.
Define function
hi(x) =
1
|Λ(x)| − 1
 ∑
j∈Λ(x)
1
vj − x
− 1
vi − x,∀i ∈ Λ(x).
Theorem 1. Suppose Λ(x) does not change in bid interval (b1, b2), and vi(x) is constant
for x ∈ (b1, b2), i ∈ Λ(x). Then the bid distribution of every buyer in Λ is differentiable
in this interval. In fact, for any x ∈ (b1, b2) we have
fi(x)
Fi(x)
= hi(x),∀i ∈ Λ.
Proof. For any bid x ∈ (b1, b2), the utility of buyer i is:
ui(vi) = (vi − x)FN\Λ(x)FΛ\i(x), ∀i ∈ Λ (1)
Since buyers in N \ Λ do not bid in interval (b1, b2), we have FN\Λ(x) = FN\Λ(b1). After
multiplication over i ∈ Λ, we have∏
i∈Λ
ui(vi) =
∏
i∈Λ
(vi − x)(FΛ(x))|Λ|−1(FN\Λ(b1))|Λ|,
where |Λ| is the number of buyers in the bidding set Λ. We use Equation (1) to cancel
out the term FΛ(b1) and get
Fi(x) =
vi − x
ui(vi)
(∏
i∈Λ
ui(vi)
vi − x
) 1
|Λ|−1 (
FN\Λ(x)
)− 1|Λ|−1
Since the right hand side of the equation is differentiable with x, the left hand side Fi(x)
is differentiable. Take derivatives on both sides, we get
fi(x) =
[
1
|Λ| − 1
(∑
j∈Λ
1
vj − x
)
− 1
vi − x
]
Fi(x)
=hi(x)Fi(x).
If we know what the bidding set Λ(x) is for every possible x in the BNE, we can
construct each buyer’s bid distribution fi(x) according to Theorem 1. Therefore, the rest
of this section is devoted to the analysis of how the bidding set changes.
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Now we discuss the basic component Si(vji ). When buyers’ values are continuous, it
is known that the support of the bidding strategy is connected for every buyer[14]. This
result no longer holds in the discrete value setting. In Example 3, Buyer 3’s possible
bids have two connected parts. However, we can prove a weaker version of this structural
result.
Theorem 2. Si(v
j
i ) is an interval when v
j
i ≥ b.
We defer the proof to Appendix A.
Remark 1. In Example 3, ties happen with zero probability when the winning bid is
greater than b, but with strict positive probability when the winning bid is b. Buyer 1
with value 2 bids 2 and Buyer 3 with value 3 is also likely to bid 2. By Assumption
1, Buyer 3 is the winner since he has a greater value. Actually, Assumption 1 is only
used in dealing with the best response issue when players tie at the smallest winning bid
b. Suppose the unique BNE under this assumption is E. We can create an approximate
BNE with -BNE E ′ which does not need the tie-breaking assumption, i.e., the highest
bid are resolved randomly. The only change is that when a player is supposed to bid b in
E and this playerâĂŹs value is larger than b, we let this player bid b +  in E ′ instead.
Therefore, the tie-breaking rule can be viewed as a way of obtaining an approximate BNE.
Once the output of the algorithm is obtained, it is still an approximate BNE even without
the tie-breaking rule.
4.1 Change points of the bidding set
In this section, we consider some properties of the bidding set at its change points. These
results are helpful for computing these change points.
Definition 2. When bidding set changes at x, we use Λ+(x) and Λ−(x) to denote the
buyers who bid in the upper neighborhood and lower neighborhood around x, i.e.,
Λ+(x) = {i | ∃ > 0, (x, x+ ) ⊆ Si} ,
Λ−(x) = {i | ∃ > 0, (x− , x) ⊆ Si} .
Example 4. In Figure 2, Λ(8.5) = {1, 3}, Λ+(6) = {1, 2, 4} and Λ−(6) = {1, 2, 3}. The
waiting list at x = 8.5 is {2, 4}.
Clearly, when a bidding interval Si(vji ) starts or ends at a certain bid x, Λ(x) changes.
Therefore, to characterize how the bidding set changes, it suffices to determine when a
bid interval Si(vji ) starts and ends, or equivalently, when a buyer enters the bidding set
from the waiting list and vice verse. Our method falls in the backward-shooting category,
thus we compute the buyers’ bidding strategy from the largest winning bid all the way
down.
Definition 3. We say a buyer enters the bidding set with value vi at bid x if x =
maxSi(vi). Similarly, we say a buyer leaves the bidding set if x = minSi(vi).
Remark 2. Notice that entering the bidding set with value vi is different from:
i 6∈ Λ+(x), and i ∈ Λ−(x).
The reason is that it is possible for the buyer to leave the bidding set with another value
v′i and enters immediately at the same point, but with a different value vi. In this case,
the buyer is always in the bidding set around x, but his value changes.
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4.2 When to enter the bidding set
The following lemma gives an important property at the point where a buyer enters the
bidding set.
Lemma 5. If buyer i with value vi enters the bidding set at point b, then we have
1
|Λ+(b)| − 1
∑
j∈Λ+(b)
1
vj − x ≤
1
vi − x,∀x ∈ (b, b+ ),
1
|Λ−(b)| − 1
∑
j∈Λ−(b)
1
vj − x ≥
1
vi − x.∀x ∈ (b− , b).
Proof. The first inequality is because buyer i has no incentive to bid b +  instead of b.
The second inequality is because of Theorem 1.
To determine the exact entering point, we introduce φ∗(x).
Definition 4. Given the bid x, define virtual value φ∗(x) that satisfies the function:
1
|Λ(x)| − 1
∑
i∈Λ(x)
1
vi − x =
1
φ∗(x)− x
The definition of φ∗(x) is based on Λ(x). When Λ(x) changes, φ∗(x) also changes as
a consequence.
Theorem 3. φ∗(x) strictly decreases with respect to x.
The following theorem determines when should a buyer enter the bidding set.
Theorem 4. Suppose buyer i has the largest unconsumed value vi in the waiting list, he
will enter the bidding set immediately when either one of the following two conditions is
satisfied.
• |Λ| ≤ 1 and vi > x;
• 1
vi−x ≤ 1|Λ|−1
∑
i∈Λ
1
vj(x)−x (or equivalently hi(x) ≥ 0) and vi > x.
Example 5. Consider bid 6 in Example 3 and Figure 2. Bidding set Λ+(6) is {1, 2, 4},
with corresponding values 20, 14, and 12. all buyers in Λ+(6) have consumed the proba-
bility of their current value at bid 6, and they all leave the bidding set. Thus the bidding
set becomes empty and the waiting list contains all buyers. Buyer 2 has the largest uncon-
sumed value 13 in the waiting list. Since there is no buyer in the bidding set, according
to Theorem 4, buyer 2 enters the bidding set.
Next, buyer 1 has the largest unconsumed value in the waiting list. Since there is only
one buyer (buyer 2) in the bidding set, according to Theorem 4, he also enters the bidding
set.
Then, buyer 3 and 4 are in the waiting list with values 9 and 1. Now the first condition
in Theorem 4 cannot be satisfied since the current bidding set already contains two buyers.
For buyer 3, we have 1/(9− 6) ≤ 1/(10− 6) + 1(13− 6), satisfying the second condition.
Therefore, buyer 3 also enters the bidding set. However, buyer 4 has value 1 which is
smaller than the current bid, so buyer 4 is not eligible to enter the bidding set. After the
update, we have Λ−(6) = {1, 2, 3}.
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4.3 When to exit the bidding set
The probability of a buyer’s value being vi should equal the probability that he bids in
the interval Si(vi). By Theorem 2, the bid set Si(vi) of a specific value vi is a connected
interval. Therefore, once we know the maximum bid in Si(vi), we can compute his
bid distribution all the way down (according to Theorem 1) until the bid distribution
consumes all the corresponding value probability.
Theorem 5. Buyer i with value vki leaves the bidding set at x when the cumulative
probability of bidding set equals to the probability of the value, i.e., Fi
(
maxSi(v
k
i )
) −
Fi(x) = Gi(v
k
i )−Gi(vk−1i ).
Example 6. Consider Example 3 and Figure 2, S1(20) begins at bid 9 and consumes the
probability of value 20 at bid 6. The probability that buyer 1 bids in S1(20) is
F1(9)− F1(6) = 11
20− 9 −
77
48
√
10− 6
(9− 6)(13− 6) = 1−
11
24
√
7
3
,
which equals the probability of value 20.
4.4 Monotonicity of entering and exiting points
Now we present some monotonicity results in the discrete setting. These results are
similar to the continuous case, but with different proofs.
For convenience, we define
pji = lnGi(v
j
i )− lnGi(vj−1i ), ∀i = 1, . . . , n, j = 2, . . . , ik.
So {pji}i=1,...,n,j=2,...,ik uniquely determines the value distribution G. When there is no
ambiguity, we use {pji} for simplicity. We use E(b¯, {pji}) to denote the set of bidding
intervals given by Algorithm 2 with a guessed largest bid b¯ and distribution G.
Theorem 6. The extreme points of every bid interval in E(b¯, {pji}) is monotone in b¯.
The proof is different from the continuous distribution. We prove it by analyzing the
algorithm directly.
Corollary 1. The position b(b¯) where Algorithm 2 stops is strictly monotone in b¯.
It is possible that some bid intervals remain at the same positions. But the position
where the algorithm stops increases strictly. Consider Example 3 and Figure 3, the end
point in E(8.5, {pji}) is 0.35 and the end point in E(9.5, {pji}) is 3.76.
Next we prove the continuity of the extreme points of each bid interval when the guess
b¯ changes.
Theorem 7. The limit of each bid interval constructed by Algorithm 2 with the largest
winning bid approaching to b¯1, is same as the bid interval constructed with the largest
winning bid b¯1.
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Figure 3: Monotonicity of b(b¯). In the left part, the guess is b¯ = 8.5 and the algorithm
stops at b(b¯) = 0.35. In the right part, the guess is b¯ = 9.5, and the algorithm stops at
b(b¯) = 3.76.
5 Existence and uniqueness of the BNE
5.1 Existence
In Algorithm 2, if the point b(b¯) where the algorithm terminates does not match the
actual smallest winning bid b, the bidding strategies we get do not form a BNE. But we
show that if it does match b, then the corresponding strategies do form a BNE.
Lemma 6. If b(b¯) matches the smallest winning bid b, the bidding strategies given by
Algorithm 2 is indeed a BNE.
Theorem 8. A Bayesian Nash Equilibrium always exists when buyers have discrete value
distributions.
Proof. If we guess b¯ = max vji , the b(b¯) given by Algorithm 2 would be max v
j
i . And if we
guess b¯ = min vji , the corresponding b(b¯) given by Algorithm 2 would be smaller than b.
By Theorem 7, there always exists a b¯∗ such that the b(b¯∗) = b. According to Lemma 6,
the guess b¯∗ indeed gives a BNE.
Previous studies use Nash’s Theorem to prove the existence of the BNE in the discrete
value case. They first prove the existence in the setting where the bid space is restricted
to a set of finite discrete bids. Then the existence in the continuous bid space is proved
by taking the limit of the equilibrium in the restricted bid space setting. However, how
to find a Bayesian Nash equilibrium is previously unknown.
Maskin and Riley [20] also propose a forward shooting method to compute the equi-
librium. They construct the BNE from the smallest winning bid. Under some conditions,
they give the solution to the ordinary differential equations around the smallest winning
bid. However, this method does not work for the discrete value setting. Because unlike
the continuous value setting where the bidding set contains all buyers, in the discrete
value setting, the bidding set at the smallest winning bid is unknown in the beginning.
Following Algorithm 2, it is easy to see that for two buyers with identical value
distributions, they must enter and leave the bidding set exactly at the same points.
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Corollary 2. Buyers with identical value distributions have identical bidding strategies
in the BNE. Furthermore, if all buyers have identical value distributions, i.e. symmetric
distributions, the Bayesian Nash equilibrium is also symmetric.
5.2 Uniqueness
According to the monotonicity of b(b¯), we can check whether the guessed bid is too high
or too low. Corollary 1 implies that only one guess of the largest winning bid b¯ can
possibly equate the corresponding b(b¯) and the actual smallest winning bid b.
Theorem 9. There exists a unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium when buyers have discrete
value distributions.
Remark 3. By uniqueness, we mean the equilibrium above the smallest winning bid is
unique. In Example 3, we can change buyer 2’s bids below 2 to any other bids below 2,
and still get an equilibrium. But we only focus on the structure above the smallest winning
bid.
In the continuous distribution case, in order to prove the uniqueness result, Lebrun
[16] relies on the assumption that the distribution is strictly log-concave (fi/Fi is strictly
decreasing) at the highest lower extremity of the supports, i.e., v11 in our example. Briefly
speaking, he uses this assumption to handle the case where some buyers always give bids
that is larger than b. However, in the discrete setting, according to our results, we do not
need to deal with such cases.
Furthermore, our algorithm does not have the sensitivity issue that are difficult to
address in continuous algorithms.
6 Experiments
6.1 Implementation
Algorithm 1 computes the BNE of the first-price auction by repeatedly guessing the
largest winning bid b¯. According to Theorem 1, the change points of the bidding set
completely determines the buyers’ bidding strategies in the BNE. And given a guess b¯,
we compute the change points of the bidding set Λ(x) using Algorithm 2.
Given a guess of the largest winning bid b¯, we need to first determine the initial
bidding set (line 2 in Algorithm 2). This can be easily done by setting the initial bidding
set Λ(b¯) = ∅, and then adding buyers to Λ(b¯) according to Theorem 4.
In Algorithm 1, different guesses of the highest winning bid may result in different
bidding strategies of the buyers. However, only the correct guess of the largest winning
bid will produce the actual BNE. Since b(b¯) is monotone in b¯, we can compare b(b¯) with
the actual smallest winning bid given by Lemma 1 to check whether the guess is too high
or too low, and shorten the interval where the actual highest winning bid can lie.
6.1.1 Predicting the change points of the bidding set
Given a guess of the largest winning bid b¯, our algorithm computes the bidding strategies
all the way down from b¯ to b(b¯). A naive way to compute how the bidding set changes is
to decrease the bid gradually and see whether any buyer would leave or enter the bidding
set. However, we can accelerate this process by predicting the next change point directly.
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Suppose the current change point is b and we want to predict the next change point
b′ < b. Assume that the bidding set changes at b′ because of buyer i4. There are two
possibilities:
• buyer i enters the bidding set with value vji ;
• buyer i leaves the bidding set with value vji .
For the first possibility, the two conditions in Theorem 4 are satisfied at point b′.
Therefore, we must have
vji ≥ b′ and hi(b′) ≥ 0. (2)
By assumption, the bidding set Λ does not change in the interval (b′, b). Thus hi(x)
can be easily computed in this interval and we can easily find the largest solution b′ to
the above inequalities.
It is worth mentioning that it can be sometimes problematic when solving equation
hi(x) = 0, since it involves division operations. However, this can be easily overcome by
solving the following polynomial and discarding inappropriate solutions:
0 =
[
(vi − x)
∏
j∈Λ
(vj − x)
]
hi(x) =
vi − x
|Λ| − 1
∑
j∈Λ
∏
k∈Λ\{j}
(vk − x)−
∏
j∈Λ
(vj − x). (3)
For the second possibility, we need to check when the probability of vji will be con-
sumed completely. Let α be the remaining probability of vji at point b:
α = Fi(b)−Gi(vj−1i ).
By Theorem 1, we have
d lnFi(x)
dx
= hi(x).
Define
Hi(x) = ln(vi − x)− 1|Λ(x)| − 1
∑
j∈Λ
ln(vi − x).
It’s easy to see that H ′i(x) = hi(x). Therefore, to compute the leaving point of buyer
i, we need to solve ∫ b
b′
d lnFi(x) =
∫ b
b′
hi(x) dx =
∫ b
b′
d lnHi(x).
Or equivalently,
lnFi(b)− ln(Fi(b)− α) = lnFi(b)− lnGi(vj−1i ) = Hi(b)−Hi(b′). (4)
In fact, every buyer could cause the bidding set to change. Thus, to compute the
actual next change point, we need to enumerate all possibilities, i.e., for each buyer i,
assume the bidding set changes due to this buyer and compute the change point b′i. And
the actual change point is the largest among them:
b′ = max
i
{b′i}.
4It is possible that the bidding set changes because of multiple buyers. However, the analysis still
applies
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6.1.2 Updating the bidding set
After predicting the next change point b′ and the corresponding buyer i, we need to
update the bidding set Λ(b′). Of course, buyer i should be removed from or added to the
bidding set accordingly. But it is also possible that other buyer may enter or leave the
bidding set as well, since the bidding set has changed.
According to Theorem 5, if a buyer is already in the bidding set, he will only leave
when the corresponding value has been consumed. Therefore, at point b′, any buyer in Λ
with unconsumed value will not leave Λ no matter how Λ changes. So if we remove all
buyers whose values are consumed at b′, we can guarantee that all the remaining buyers
in Λ will still be in Λ after the update.
The next step is to add the buyers in the waiting list to the bidding set. Suppose
buyer j is the buyer with the largest unconsumed value in the waiting list. According to
Theorem 4, we can check whether buyer j will enter the bidding set or not. There are
two cases:
1. If buyer j enters the bidding set, then we have new buyer with the largest un-
consumed value, and we can repeat this process until the buyer with the largest
unconsumed value does not enter the bidding set, which becomes the next case;
2. If buyer j does not enter the bidding set, then all the other buyers in the waiting list
does not enter, either. This can be easily proved using Theorem 4 by contradiction.
Therefore, in Algorithm 2, when updating the bidding set, we first remove buyers
from it and then add buyers from the waiting list.
6.1.3 Complexity of Algorithm 1
We first consider the complexity of Algorithm 2, since it is used as sub-routine in Algo-
rithm 1. We have efficient algorithms to solve Equation (2) and (4), since Equation (2)
is equivalent to a polynomial (Equation (3)), and Equation (4) is a root finding problem
for a monotone functions. For ease of presentation, we regard solving Equation (3) or
Equation (4) as one operation.
Let m =
∑
i di be the total number of discrete values. Then we have
Lemma 7. Algorithm 2 requires at most 2mn operations.
Proof. Each buyer with each possible value at most changes the bidding set twice (the
entering point and the leaving point). So there are at most 2m change points. For each
change point, the algorithm solves at most n equations, either in the form of Equation
(3) or Equation (4).
Theorem 10. Let L = max{∪i∈N supp(Gi)}. Suppose we use UB − LB <  as the exit
condition. Then Algorithm 1 requires O(mn log(L/)) operations.
Proof. Algorithm 2 requires O(mn) operations according to Lemma 7. Algorithm 1 does
a binary search in the interval (0, L), which requires O(log(L/)) runs of Algorithm 2.
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6.2 Experiment results
6.2.1 Accuracy comparison between continuous algorithms and our algo-
rithm
When buyers have discrete value distributions, one natural way of computing the BNE
is to approximate the discrete value distribution with a continuous one. Of course, there
are infinitely many ways of approximation. Our choice is to replace a discrete value with
a “triangle” probability density centered at that value, and cover the interval [v1i , v
di
i ] with
a small uniform distribution. Formally,
fi(t) =

[
pdi
w2
(t− vdi + w)
]
(1− ) +  · ui ∃d, t ∈ [vdi − w, vdi ][
− pdi
w2
(t− vdi − w)
]
(1− ) +  · ui ∃d, t ∈ [vdi , vdi + w]
0 t < v1i − w or t > vdii + w
 · ui otherwise
,
where ui = 1
v
di
i −v1i +2w
.
For simplicity, we assume that for all i and d, |vd+1i − vdi | > 2w and w < vdi < 1− w.
Note that although we stick to this approximation throughout this section, our analysis
also applies to other possible ways of approximation.
We implemented the continuous backward-shooting algorithm using the characteriza-
tion by Maskin and Riley [19]:
dti(b)
db
=
Fi(ti(b))
fi(ti(b)
[(
1
n− 1
n∑
j=1
1
tj(b)− b
)
− 1
ti(b)− b
]
,∀i ∈ [n] (5)
ALGORITHM 3: The continuous backward-shooting algorithm
Input: step s, max winning bid guess b¯
Output: the min winning bid
1 b← b¯, ti ← 1;
2 while ti > b,∀i ∈ [n] do
3 for i ∈ [n] do
4 compute t′i(b) according to Equation (5);
5 ti ← ti − t′i(b) · s;
6 end
7 b← b− s;
8 end
9 return b;
Using a smaller step size s could significantly increase the number of loops inside
Algorithm 3. However, using a smaller s could also make the computation result more
accurate. Also, when ti 6∈ ∪i,d[vdi −w, vdi +w], i.e., fi(ti) = , the ratio Fi(ti)fi(ti) could be very
large. Therefore, using a relatively large s could lead to a sudden decrease of ti, causing
the program to skip other vdi ’s in between.
The above problem can be avoided by carefully tuning the parameter s. However,
the possible large values of Fi(ti)
fi(ti)
can also cause other problems that may not have easy
solutions:
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1. a large Fi(ti)
fi(ti)
leads to a large t′i(b), meaning that t(b) decreases much faster than b.
This problem could cause the program to terminate early if t(b) becomes smaller
than b.
2. in the next loop, t′i(b) can be negative and ti will oscillate as a result (see Figure 5).
To understand the first problem, consider the following example:
Example 7. Consider the case where there are 6 buyers. Their value distributions are
as follows:
(v11, v
2
1, v
3
1) = (0.08, 0.2, 0.8), (p
1
1, p
2
1, p
3
1) = (0.2, 0.76, 0.04),
(v12, v
2
2, v
3
2) = (0.09, 0.3, 0.9), (p
1
2, p
2
2, p
3
2) = (0.3, 0.36, 0.34),
(v13, v
2
3, v
3
3) = (0.07, 0.12, 0.7), (p
1
3, p
2
3, p
3
3) = (0.3, 0.36, 0.34),
(v14, v
2
4, v
3
4) = (0.07, 0.12, 0.7), (p
1
4, p
2
4, p
3
4) = (0.3, 0.36, 0.34),
(v15, v
2
5, v
3
5) = (0.07, 0.12, 0.7), (p
1
5, p
2
5, p
3
5) = (0.2, 0.15, 0.65),
(v16, v
2
6, v
3
6) = (0.04, 0.12, 0.8), (p
1
6, p
2
6, p
3
6) = (0.2, 0.15, 0.65).
Figure 4
Figure 4 shows the bidding strategy of Buyer 5 in the above example. The minimum
winning bid computed by the continuous algorithm is about 0.12, while the actual minimum
winning bid is 0.08, indicating that Algorithm 3 terminates early. The reason is that
during the execution of Algorithm 3, when b is near 0.12, t2 is near 0.25, but t′2 is over
1500. This means that a slight decrease in b could lead to a significant drop in t2, making
t2 < b and terminating the algorithm.
To understand the second problem, consider the case where ti is close to b in the BNE
for some b. Then t′i will very likely to be negative according to Equation (5), and it is not
clear how we could avoid such problems since the computation of t′i is independent of s.
Example 8. Consider the case where there are 3 buyers. Their value distributions are
as follows:
(v11, v
2
1, v
3
1) = (0.1, 0.2, 0.25), (p
1
1, p
2
1, p
3
1) = (0.25, 0.25, 0.5),
(v12, v
2
2, v
3
2) = (0.1, 0.2, 0.25), (p
1
2, p
2
2, p
3
2) = (0.05, 0.45, 0.5),
(v13, v
2
3, v
3
3) = (0.1, 0.2, 0.25), (p
1
3, p
2
3, p
3
3) = (0.05, 0.45, 0.5).
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Figure 5 shows the bidding strategy of Buyer 1 in BNE. The bid distribution F (b) is
computed according to the corresponding t(b). The oscillation in the curve indicates the
oscillation in t(b). As shown in the figure, the oscillation occurs when v(b) is close to b.
Figure 5: The oscillation of continuous algorithms. The two curves corresponds to buyer
1’s equilibrium bidding strategy computed by both the continuous and the discrete algo-
rithms.
Although the continuous backward-shooting algorithm can be problematic, our exper-
iments show that it has good performance if we only need to figure out the maximum win-
ning bid b¯. The problems we mentioned mainly affects the computation of the strategies
for smaller values. The computation of this part of strategies also suffers from sensitivity
issues, as discussed in [7]. To overcome this difficulty, Fibich and Gavish [7] proposed
another algorithm where guessing the maximum winning bid is no longer needed. We also
try their algorithms and conduct experiments. When it comes to approximating discrete
value distributions with continuous ones, the computation still suffers from sensitivity
issues due to very high condition numbers, implying that the sensitivity might be an
intrinsic issue of this problem.
However, our discrete algorithm does not use continuous distributions to approximate
discrete ones, thus can avoid all the above problems. The computational complexity
only depends on the number of value points. Also, our algorithm does not have the
oscillation problem or sensitivity issues, since our theoretical analysis already characterize
the structure of the solution, and involves none of the sensitivity computation mentioned
above. Therefore, our discrete algorithm can provide a much accurate solution compared
to other ones. Such a high accuracy enables us to perform further researches related to
first price auctions (see Section 6.2.3 for example).
6.2.2 Running time comparison between continuous algorithms and our al-
gorithm
In this section, we compare the running time of previous continuous algorithms and our
discrete algorithm. Since the algorithm provided by Fibich and Gavish [7] often gives a
condition number issue, we only compare our algorithm with Algorithm 3 in these ex-
periments. We conduct experiments for three different settings. For each setting, the
experiment setup is as follows: We generate 1000 first price auction instances, with each
containing n buyers. For each buyer, we sample d different values from the interval [0, 1],
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and the corresponding value distribution is also randomly generated for each buyer. Then
both our algorithm and Algorithm 3 are applied to compute the Bayes-Nash equilibrium.
Both these two algorithms need to guess the maximum winning bid, so the final com-
puted minimum winning bid would be different from the actual minimum winning bid.
Therefore we also set a tolerance parameter tol, which serves as a stopping criterion (i.e.,
the algorithm terminates when the difference between the computed minimum winning
bid and the actual minimum winning bid is smaller than tol). As these algorithm runs,
we record the running time of the algorithms on each instance. Considering that in some
cases, the algorithms may take a very long time to terminate, we set another deadline
parameter T , and kill the process once the running time exceeds T . During the exper-
iments, we make sure that no other programs are running and at any time, only one
algorithm is running on one instance. Also, we only compare the running time in these
experiments, so detailed solution qualities are ignored.
The parameters for the three settings are as follows:
• small: n = 5, d = 5, T = 30 seconds;
• medium: n = 10, d = 10, T = 60 seconds;
• large:n = 100, d = 100, T = 60 seconds;
For all the settings, we run our algorithm with tol = 10−8, and run Algorithm 3 twice
with tol = 0.1 and tol = 0.01. The experiment results are shown in Figure
(a) Small instances (b) Medium instances
Figure 6: Running time comparison. The y-axis is the cumulative distribution of the
running time for the 1000 instances (i.e., the number of instances finished within the
corresponding time period). For large instances, no algorithm can finish the computation
within the 60 seconds deadline, thus are not shown.
For the 1000 small instances, although we set a much smaller tolerance value tol =
10−8 for our algorithm, our algorithm finishes on almost all instances (955) within the
30 seconds deadline, Algorithm 3 finishes on only 256 instances when tol = 0.1 and on
only 22 instances when tol = 0.01. For medium instances, our algorithm finishes on 512
of them, while Algorithm 3 does not finish on any instance within the deadline. And
for large instances, no algorithm ever finishes on any instance within the deadline. It
is interesting that our algorithm either finishes very quickly, or does not finish after a
relatively long time. For example, among the finished 955 small instances, almost all of
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them finish within the first 3.5 seconds. This is also true for medium instances. The
reason behind this observation is still unknown. We believe this is closely related to
specific value distributions in the instances.
6.2.3 Welfare comparison between first and second price auctions
In this section, we compare the welfare of the first price auction and the second price
auction, which we denote byWelf andWels, respectively. The ratioWelf/Wels is called
the price of anarchy:
Definition 5 (Price of anarchy (PoA)). The price of anarchy of the first price auction
is defined as the minimum ratio between the welfare of the first price auction and that of
the second price auction, i.e.,
PoA = min
Welf
Wels
,
where the minimization is over all possible value distributions.
For general n players, [10] shows an example with PoA = 0.869 and [11] proves
that PoA is at least 0.743. We try to answer this question by running our algorithm on
approximate discrete value distributions. We only consider the problem with two players.
Our result provides evidence, though in a limited searching space, that the correct ratio
would be around 0.869.
There are infinitely many value distributions, thus it is impossible to enumerate.
However, we could just search for the smallest ratioWelf/Wels in a much smaller discrete
space as follows:
vdi =
d
D
, ∀0 ≤ d ≤ D, i = 1, 2,
pdi ∈
{m
M
| 0 ≤ m ≤M,m ∈ N
}
,∀0 ≤ d ≤ D, i = 1, 2,∑
d
vdi = 1, i = 1, 2.
For simplicity, we normalize the value distributions so that the maximum possible
value is 1. It is easy to see that there are only 1
2
(
M+d
d
) [(
M+d
d
)
+ 1
]
distinct value distri-
bution pairs.
According to Lebrun [15], if two value distributions are “close”, then the correspond-
ing bidding strategies and the resulting welfare values are also “close”. Therefore, the
minimum ratio in the above discrete space should shed us with some insight about what
the actual continuous distribution that minimizes the welfare ratio.
In our experiments, we choose d = 6 and M = 10. Thus there are 1
2
(
16
6
) [(
16
6
)
+ 1
]
=
32068036 value distribution pairs to consider. We computed the ratio Welf/Wels for all
of them, and the smallest one (Welf/Wels = 0.89638) is given by the following value
distributions:
p51 = 1.0,
p02 = 0.6, p
2
2 = 0.2, p
3
2 = 0.2.
In this example, Player 1 has a constant large value while Player 2 has a low value
distribution. It coincides with the example introduced by [10], i.e., there is a player with
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a large constant value, while the other players have the identical distribution over a low
value range.
Therefore, we make the conjecture that in the extreme case where PoA achieves its
smallest value, there exists a player with constant value which is larger than the other
players’ values.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we consider the problem of computing the BNE of the first price auction
for discrete value distributions. From the theoretical point of view, we first propose
Algorithm 2 to compute it. Contrary to previous algorithms for the continuous value case,
our algorithm does not need to solve the ordinary differential equations. The number of
computation operations is at most 2nm in Algorithm 2. Our algorithm is enabled by the
introduction of a useful tool called the bidding set and careful analysis of the detailed
structure of the BNE of the first price auction.
Then, we show the BNE is unique without any assumptions on the value distributions.
From the practical point of view, Algorithm 2 is much faster than the traditional algo-
rithms when computing BNE under the same discrete distribution. Algorithm 2 is also
more robust on providing the strategies on small values shown in Example 4. Thus our
algorithm has a great advantage over the traditional algorithms for practical applications.
With such an algorithm to compute the BNE, we can also explore other problems
related to first price auctions. For example, we compare the revenue generated in the
first and the second price auctions. It shows that in extreme cases, each auction can
perform much better than the other. The price of anarchy of the first price auction
is also measured in a set of approximate distributions, we give a conjecture about the
extreme case based on our experiments and observations.
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APPENDIX
A Omitted proof in Section 4
A.1 Proof of Theorem 2
To prove Theorem 2, We first consider a lemma which compare buyers’ value from the
bid distribution.
Lemma 8. Assume bid b1 is an element in Si(vi), and bid b2 is an element in Sj(vj).
Suppose b1 < b2. If there is zero probability that buyer i bids in (b1, b2), then we have
vj ≥ vi. Furthermore, if vj = vi, then there is zero probability that buyer j bids in (b1, b2)
too.
Proof. Since b1 is in Si(vi), b1 is a best response for buyer i with value vi.
(vi − b1) · FΩ\i(b1) ≥ (vi − b2) · FΩ\i(b2)
(vj − b2) · FΩ\j(b2) ≥ (vj − b1) · FΩ\j(b1)
Multiply two equations and get
vi − b1
vi − b2 ·
Fi(b2)
Fi(b1)
≥ vj − b1
vj − b2 ·
Fj(b2)
Fj(b1)
By Lemma 3, there is no mass bid in buyer i’s bid distribution between (b1, b2), i.e.,
Fi(b2) = Fi(b1). Since Fj(b2) ≥ Fj(b1), we have
vi − b1
vi − b2 ≥
vj − b1
vj − b2
vj ≥ vi
If vj = vi, all the inequalities should be equality. Then we have Fj(b2) = Fj(b1).
Proof. We prove the theorem by contradiction. Assume there is a value with a jump in
its bid set. By jump, we mean the closure of the support of Si is not connected. Let
vki = maxj,l{vlj | Sj(vlj) has a jump.}. Since there is a jump, we assume b1, b2 ∈ Si(vki ),
and (b1, b2) ∩ Si(vki ) = ∅. Assume buyer j with value vlj has bid in this interval (b1, b2).
By Lemma 8, we have vlj ≥ vki . If vlj = vki , then buyer j with value vlj has zero probability
bidding in the interval (b1, b2). There is no impact when the probability is zero. So we
can regard this case as buyer j does not bid in (b1, b2).
If vkj > vi, by the assumption that vki is the largest value that has a gap in the support,
we know Sj(vlj) has no jump. Sj(vlj) is a connected interval. So we can get Sj(vlj) from
Sj(v
l
j) after removing possibly infinite points.
Let set Λ1 denote the buyers who bid in the upper neighborhood of b1 and Λ2 denote
the buyers who bid in the lower neighborhood of b2. Formally, we have
Λ1 =
{
j | ∃vlj,  > 0 s.t. Sj(vlj) ∩ (b1, b2) 6= ∅ and (b1, b1 + ) ⊂ Sj(vlj)
}
,
Λ2 =
{
j | ∃vlj,  > 0 s.t. Sj(vlj) ∩ (b1, b2) 6= ∅ and (b2 − , b2) ⊂ Sj(vlj)
}
.
Buyers who bid in (b1, b2) have connected bidding intervals. By Lemma 2, the union of
these connected bidding intervals cover (b1, b2). So set Λ1,Λ2 are well defined and not
empty.
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For any j ∈ Λ1, we claim b2 ∈ Sj =
⋃
h Sj(v
h
j ). Otherwise, Sj has jump around b2.
Then we define
v∗j = max {v | Sj(v) ⊆ [0, b2)} .
By Lemma 8, we have vki ≥ v∗j . By the monotonicity property (Lemma 4), we have
v∗j ≥ vj. Thus we have vki ≥ v∗j ≥ vj > vki , a contradiction.
So for any j ∈ Λ1, we have b2 ∈ Sj which implies j ∈ Λ2. Thus Λ1 is a subset of Λ2.
Since bid b1 +  does not generate more utility than bid b1, for buyer i with value vki , the
derivative of (vki − x)
∏
j∈Λ1 Fj(x) at x = b1 is non-positive. Taking derivatives, we get∑
j∈Λ1
fj(b1)
Fj(b1)
≤ 1
vi−b1 . By Theorem 1, we should have
1
|Λ1| − 1
∑
j∈Λ1
1
vj(b1)− b1 ≤
1
vki − b1
.
Since buyer i weakly prefer bid b rather than b2 − , similarly we should have
1
|Λ2| − 1
∑
j∈Λ2
1
vj(b2)− b2 ≥
1
vi − b2 .
Based on these two equations, we have,
|Λ2| − 1 ≤
∑
j∈Λ2
vi − b2
vj(b2)− b2
≤ |Λ2| − |Λ1|+
∑
j∈Λ1
vi − b2
vj(b2)− b2
< |Λ2| − |Λ1|+
∑
j∈Λ1
vi − b1
vj(b2)− b1
≤ |Λ2| − |Λ1|+
∑
j∈A
vi − b1
vj(b1)− b1
≤ |Λ2| − |Λ1|+ |Λ1| − 1.
A contradiction.
A.2 Proof of Theorem 3
Proof. The proof consists of two parts. Lemma 9 solves the case when Λ(x) is fixed.
Lemma 10 solves the case when Λ(x) changes.
Lemma 9. When Λ(x) does not change and the buyer’s value in bidding set keep the
same, Λ∗(x) strictly decreases as x decreases.
Proof. For any j ∈ Λ, we have
1
|Λ| − 1
∑
i∈Λ
1
vi − x −
1
vj − x ≥ 0,
1
φ∗(x)− x ≥
1
vj − x.
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1|Λ| − 1
∑
i∈Λ
1
vi − x =
1
φ∗(x)− x.
Recall that Λ(x) is fixed. By definition of φ∗, it is differentiable. We take derivatives on
the both sides,
1
|Λ| − 1
∑
i∈Λ
1
(vi − x)2 =
1− (φ∗)′(x)
(φ∗(x)− x)2 ,
[φ∗(x)− x]2 · 1|Λ| − 1
∑
i∈Λ
1
(vi − x)2 = 1− (φ
∗)′(x).
We want to prove (φ∗)′(x) > 0, it is equivalent to prove
[φ∗(x)− x]2 · 1|Λ| − 1
∑
i∈Λ
1
(vi − x)2 < 1,
⇔ 1|Λ| − 1
∑
i∈Λ
1
(vi − x)2 <
1
(|Λ| − 1)2
(∑
i∈Λ
1
vi − x
)2
,
⇔(|Λ| − 1)
∑
i∈Λ
1
(vi − x)2 <
(∑
i∈Λ
1
vi − x
)2
. (6)
By Theorem 1, for any j ∈ Λ, we have
(|Λ| − 1) 1
(vj − x)2 ≤
(∑
i∈Λ
1
vi − x
)
· 1
vj − x.
Since it is impossible that for all j ∈ Λ it is equality, so the sum of inequalities is a strict
inequality. Thus we prove Eq. (6).
Lemma 10. In all possible changes, φ∗(x) weakly decreases.
Proof. We consider the general case at bid b. Let Λ1 = Λ+(b)\Λ−(b), Λ2 = Λ+(b)∪Λ−(b),
and Λ3 = Λ−(b) \ Λ+(b).
We want to prove
1
|Λ1 ∪ Λ2| − 1
∑
i∈Λ1∪Λ2
1
φ∗i (b+ )− b
≤ 1|Λ2 ∪ Λ3| − 1
∑
i∈Λ2∪Λ3
1
φ∗i (b− )− b
.
By Lemma 5, we have
1
φ∗i (b− )− b
≥ 1|Λ1 ∪ Λ2| − 1
∑
j∈Λ1∪Λ2
1
φ∗j(b− )− b
,∀i ∈ Λ3 (7)
1
φ∗i (b− )− b
≤ 1|Λ1 ∪ Λ2| − 1
∑
j∈Λ1∪Λ2
1
φ∗j(b− )− b
,∀i ∈ Λ1 (8)
Sum Equation (7) over i ∈ Λ3, and we have∑
i∈Λ3
1
φ∗i (b− )− b
≥ |Λ3||Λ1 ∪ Λ2| − 1
∑
j∈Λ1∪Λ2
1
φ∗j(b− )− b
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Sum Equation (8) over i ∈ Λ1, and we have∑
i∈Λ2
1
φ∗i (b− )− b
≥ |Λ2| − 1|Λ1 ∪ Λ2| − 1
∑
j∈Λ1∪Λ2
1
φ∗j(b− )− b
.
Combining the two inequalities above completes the proof.
A.3 Proof of Theorem 4
Proof. We prove the theorem by contradiction. Suppose b is the largest point where there
is a buyer i, who satisfies the condition of entering the bidding set, but in BNE he enters
the bidding set at some later point, say y. By the Lemma 5, we have 1
φ∗(x−)−x− ≥ 1vi−x−
in BNE. Then φ∗(x−) ≤ vi. By Theorem 3, virtual value strictly increases, i.e., φ∗(y) <
φ∗(x−), y < x−. We have 1
φ∗(y)−y >
1
vi−y . A contradiction.
A.4 Proof for Theorem 6
Proof. We guess two largest winning bids b1 < b2. Next we transform E(b1, {pji}) into
E(b2, {pji}) through intermediate steps with changing the probability parameters.
In the structure E(b1, {pji}), we sort the bid intervals by their lower extreme points
denoted by lk =
[
lk, lk
]
, k ∈ [∑i di] where l1 ≥ l2 ≥ ... ≥ l∑i di . We use buyer(lk) to
indicate the buyer who gives this bid interval and use index(lk) to indicate the value
index of buyer(lk). Formally, we have Sbuyer(lk)
(
v
index(lk)
buyer(lk)
)
=
[
lk, lk
]
.
By changing the probability parameter {pji}, we can control where a buyer leaves
the bidding set according to Theorem 5. We create a parameter profile {pji}(1) such that
E(b2, {pji}(1)) and E(b
1
, {pji}(1)) are same when bid intervals are restricted to the
[
−∞, b1
]
area. We can do this by increasing pdii for i ∈ Λ1(b¯1) such that every buyer in Λ1(b¯1) are
still bidding at b¯1 under his largest value. Here we use Λ1 to denote the bidding set in
the structure E(b1, {pji}(1)).
Set k = 1 at first. We choose a parameter profile {pji}(k+1) satisfying two conditions.
Condition 1 is that the bid intervals in E(b2, {pji}(k+1)) and E(b
2
, {pji}) are same when they
are restricted to the
[
lk, b
2
]
area. Condition 2 is that every corresponding bid intervals
in E(b2, {pji}(k)) and E(b
1
, {pji}) have same lower extreme points when they are restricted
to the [−∞, lk] area. By the second condition,
{
p
value(lk)
buyer(lk)
}(k)
returns to {pji}.
By changing the parameter, the bid interval of buyer(lk) with index(lk)-th value ends
earlier. For any bid x, 1|Λ(x)|−1
∑
i∈Λ(x)
1
vi(x)−x increases when any buyer in the bidding
set Λ(x) leaves. This change has two impacts. First, bid density increases in the range
where buyer(lk) leaves. The position that bid probability achieves the value probability
becomes higher. Second, because the bidding set changes, the location where a buyer
enters the bidding set may change too. Remember we keep the lower extreme point of
every bid intervals unchanged. Thus there is only one possible change in the bidding set
where a buyer enters, i.e., buyer(lk) leaves. The value of 1|Λ(x)|−1
∑
i∈Λ(x)
1
vi(x)−x increases.
According to Theorem 4, buyer enters bidding set earlier. Only bid intervals lm for
m ≥ k + 1 that have smaller lower extreme points have been affected. As a result,
{pji}(k+1) ≥ {pji}(k) for (i, j) not in {(buyer(lm), value(lm)),m = 1, ..k}.
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We repeat the above procedure and increase k by 1 each time. Bid intervals only
weakly increase each time. Finally, we would have {pji}(
∑
i di) = {pji} and the proof
completes.
A.5 Proof for Theorem 7
Proof. Consider the case that b gets close to b1 from the smaller side, we show the limit
of structure equals to the structure of the limit, i.e.,
lim
b→b1
E(b, {pji}) = E(b
1
, {pji}).
We prove by contradiction. The proof for the other case is similar.
Pick b2 close enough to b1 such that all the boundaries of bid intervals in E(b2, {pji})
are  close the lim
b→b1 E(b, {pji}). In the limit of structure, some intervals starts later of
ends later compared to structure of limit. We choose the largest bid position x where the
limit of structure is not equal to the structure of b1.
Since the upper part
[
x, b
2
]
is exactly same, it is impossible that the difference between
two structures is some bid interval in the limit ends later. It must be the case that some
bid interval starts later. Let buyer i has the largest corresponding value vi among bid
intervals that start later. So at the moment when buyer i joins the bidding set, the
bidding sets are same in E(b2, pji ) and E(b
1
, {pji}).
But buyer i with vi does not join the bidding set at x in E(b2, {pji}), while buyer i
joins the bidding set at x in E(b1, {pji}). It contradicts with Theorem 4.
B Omitted proofs in Section 5
B.1 Proof of Lemma 6
Proof. The algorithm stops only when |Λ| ≤ 1 and no other buyers can join the bidding
set. By definition of the smallest winning bid, we have v11 ≥ b. Since v11 is buyer 1’s
smallest value, so buyer 1 never leaves bidding set when he has value v11. Hence, the
bidding set only contains buyer 1 at the end point. Other buyers’ next values are smaller
than or equal to the value at end point. Then we put the remaining bid probability of
buyer 1 on bidding b. We are also able to create a bidding strategy For other buyers when
their value smaller than or equal to b, we create a bidding strategy such that they bid b
deterministically. In this case buyer 1 does not have incentive to deviate from bidding b
and other buyers never win in the following second price auction because their values are
smaller.
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